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We develop a model of “intrinsic” business cycles, driven by the decentralized behaviour
of entrepreneurs and ﬁrms making continuous, divisible improvements in their productivity.
We show how equilibrium cycles, associated with strategic delays in implementation and
endogenous innovation, arise even in the presence of reversible investment. We derive the
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Fluctuations in the aggregate investment rate are a central feature of the business cycle. As
Figure 1 illustrates, the rate of U.S. investment in ﬁxed, non—residential assets displays regular,
and recurring patterns of activity over time.1 In recent decades, economists have attempted to
understand movements in aggregate investment as an optimal response to measurable incentives.
In the RBC model, for example, ﬂuctuations in aggregate investment are driven by exogenous
disturbances that change the incentives to produce investment goods relative to consumption
goods. However, the short—term empirical relationship between aggregate investment and con-
temporaneous measures of investment incentives is extremely weak. In particular, while there
is some evidence of a long run relationship, neither micro nor macro level empirical work has
generally found a signiﬁcant short—run relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q – the
ratio of the equity value of ﬁrms, to the book value of the capital stock.
As is well known, one cannot necessarily infer from this that investment is sub—optimal because
Tobin’s Q need not reﬂect the marginal incentives to invest (see Abel, 1979 and Hayashi, 1982).
Moreover, equity values are likely to include the values of intangible, as well as tangible capital, as
emphasized by Hall (2001), so that measured investment and capital stocks may understate true
levels. But then the question arises as to what kind of relationship we should expect to observe
between investment and measurable proxies of ﬁnancial incentives and ﬁnancial values over the
business cycle. Figure 1 shows the investment rate and Tobin’s Q for the US between 1953 and
2003. Figure 2 shows the rate of change in the four—quarter moving average of each time series.
Because the investment rate is most highly correlated with the value of Tobin’s Q lagged about
four quarters, one interpretation of this data is that there is a lead—lag relationship between the
two variables. In principle, such a relationship might occur for essentially mechanical reasons:
a rise in Tobin’s Q signals proﬁtable investment opportunities, but actual investment can only
respond with a considerable delay. Note that this is not the same as slow adjustment of the
capital stock due, say, to a time—to—build constraint. RBC models require explicitly built—in
“time to plan” constraints in order to explain the observed pattern in this way.2 However, such
an interpretation leaves unanswered what we view as the critical puzzle of investment cycles –
why should these apparent investment opportunities arise simultaneously across diverse sectors of
1The shaded regions in Figure 1 are NBER—dated recessions. Investment data is constructed from NIPA. Data
for Tobin’s Q is constructed using Federal Reserve quarterly data.
2Christiano and Todd (1996), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano and Vigfusson (2001)
introduce “time to plan” as a ﬁxed time period between the date when the decision to invest more (less) is made
and the date when the actual funds are allocated. Wen (1998) suggests perhaps one exception to this comment.
He shows that a time to build framework with short lags in the production of capital can generate endogenously
long lags in capital formation.
1the economy? Moreover, why do many of the sharp upturns in the stockmarket appear to occur
precisely during periods when physical investment rates are crashing (often during NBER—dated
recessions)?
An alternative interpretation of Figures 1 and 2 is that a large component of stockmarket
movements do not directly reﬂect new information about investment opportunities. Instead
they are the result of costly bursts of investment in intangible capital that are anticipated to
raise future productivity. According to this view, production units bundle together two distinct
types of capital; physical and knowledge capital. Recently, Hall (2001), Hobijn and Jovanovic
(2001) and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) interpret the large equity adjustments since 1974 as the
result of changes in the value of intangible capital associated with GPTs. 3 However, in order
to assess the role of intangible capital at business cycle frequencies, one must consider the more
modest and widely dispersed productivity improvements that characterize a typical business cycle.
Fluctuations at this frequency exhibit striking sectoral co—movement in productivity, investment,
output, and factor usage through the typical business cycle (see Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1998).
T og e ta tt h i ss o r to fﬂuctuation it is necessary to understand the aggregate implications of the
actions of “small” actors in multiple sectors making independent choices over the timing and level
of investments in both physical and knowledge capital.
This is the goal of the present paper. We take as our starting point a recent body of the-
oretical work incorporating intangible capital accumulation into the analysis of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. This literature consists of two distinct strands. In one class of models (e.g. Ben-
tal and Peled, 1996, Freeman Hong and Peled, 1999, Li, 2001, Walde, 2002) cycles come about
through innovation booms in a single sector.4 While in such models it is relatively straightforward
to accommodate capital accumulation, the single sector and (often) large, indivisible nature of
innovations render them ill—suited to the analysis of high frequency business cycle ﬂuctuation. As
has often been remarked, these models are perhaps more suited to analysis of long—waves, or GPT
type innovations. A second class of models emphasizes the bunching of productivity improve-
ments in multiple disparate sectors due to optimal delay in implementation (e.g. Shleifer, 1986,
Gale, 1996, Francois and Lloyd—Ellis, 2003). These models feature multiple disparate sectors
(and ﬁrms) each following privately optimal investment decisions, and thus better correspond to
NBER length business cycles which, by deﬁnition, involve cross—sectoral co—movement. However,
the delay central to generating aggregate ﬂuctuations in these models seems, at ﬁrst blush, to be
3Speﬁcially the latter two are concerned with the IT negative shock of the early 70’s and Hall focuses on the
dramatic run-up in equities of the late 90’s, which he also attributes to IT. There is little evidence supporting
the arrival of GPTs at business cycle frequencies (see Jovanovic and Lach, 1998, and Andolfatto and Macdonald,
1998). Indeed, Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) cite evidence suggesting there have only been seven major technological
innovations of this kind identiﬁed in the last 200 years.
4Aghion and Howitt (1992) also consider the existence of cycles, but in a model without capital.
2undermined by the consumption—smoothing possibilities aﬀorded by the accumulation of physical
capital.5 Households will partially consume any anticipated increases in productivity in advance
of implementation thereby oﬀsetting the gains to delay.
A key theoretical contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that, in fact, although capital
accumulation does indeed smooth out consumption in this class of model, endogenous cycles still
persist because ﬂuctuations in the rate at which the capital stock itself is optimally adjusted
provide incentives for disparate innovators to cluster implementation. We show that, when pro-
ductivity improvements are costly to obtain, a robust cycle with endogenous delay in multiple
sectors exists, even in the presence of smoothly accumulable and reversible physical capital. More-
over, within this class of cycling equilibria, there exist relatively weak suﬃcient conditions under
which any such cyclical equilibrium is unique.6 We use this framework to explore the interac-
tion between tangible and intangible capital accumulation along the economy’s cycling path and
explore incentives for these as reﬂected by the value of the economy’s ﬁnancial assets.
Along the equilibrium growth path that we study, expansions are triggered by the imple-
mentation of accumulated productivity improvements. These improvements arrive stochastically
across sectors during the recession, gradually increasing ﬁrm values, so that Tobin’s Q starts
to rise prior to the boom. However, since ﬁrms optimally choose to delay implementation, in-
vestment lags behind the increase in Q. Physical capital accumulation peaks at the start of the
expansion and capital is accumulated continuously and smoothly, though at a declining rate, until
its end. At this point, the economy enters a recessionary phase where output falls and capital
accumulation declines more precipitously, though still remaining positive. The anticipated fall in
demand causes Tobin’s Q to fall even while investment is above its historical average so that Q
leads investment into the recession too.
The framework we build endogenously generates relatively volatile investment (both physical
and intangible) in the presence of smooth consumption behavior, and shows that these will
naturally tend to display an asynchronous pattern. It also explains crucial aspects of observed
timing at business cycle frequencies: the lead-lag relationship between Tobin’s Q and observed
investment; investment declines that precede recessions; an asynchronous pattern of cycles in
5Matsuyama’s (1999, 2001) is one approach that does not neatly ﬁt this scheme. The cycles that arise in
his model do not depend on delay, and are thus robust to capital accumulation through the cycle. However,
Matsuyama’s framework is more suited to understanding longer—term movements in the nature of growth (e.g.
productivity slowdown), rather than business cycle ﬂuctuations. In particular, there is no phase of his cycle that
could be called a recession: production and consumption never decline. Moreover, productivity rises immediately
when Q rises, reﬂecting the fact that innovations, which raise Q, are immediately implemented. Tobin’s Q would
be 1 throughout his cycle.
6Both the existence and uniqueness of the cyclical equilibrium are a result of endogenous innovation as in
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003). These results would not hold with exogenous innovation as in Shleifer (1986) and
Gale (1996).
3tangible and intangible capital formation. The process of investment in intangible capital over
the business cycle generated by our model compares well with the counter—cyclical pattern of
intangible capital formation implied by Hall’s (2001) recently constructed estimates.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model and Section 3 posits the
cyclical behavior of entrepreneurs and capital owners describes the cyclical growth path. Section
4 characterizes the implied movement of key aggregates and prices through the posited cycle and
derives necessary conditions for implied behavior to be optimal. Section 5 develops suﬃcient
conditions for the uniqueness of a stationary cyclical equilibrium and demonstrates existence.
Section 6 explores the model’s implications for key aggregates. Section 8 concludes. An appendix
provides all proofs.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Assumptions
There is no aggregate uncertainty. Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. The economy is







where ρ denotes the rate of time preference and σ represents the inverse of the elasticity of







where w(t) denotes wage income, S(t) denotes the household’s stock of assets (ﬁrm shares and
capital) at time t and R(t) denotes the discount factor from time zero to t.T h e t e r m ψ(τ)
represents lump—sum transfers from the government (see below). The population is normalized
to unity and each household is endowed with one unit of labor hours, which it supplies inelastically.
Final output is produced according to a Cobb—Douglas production function utilizing physical











Note that production is subject to exogenous total factor productivity growth at rate φ.7 We




and that ρ+(σ−1)φ > 0. Final output can be used for consumption,
7Here we have expressed this as augmenting intermediate goods, but with Cobb-Douglas technology it could
equally well be capital-augmenting or Harrod neutral.
4C(t), investment, ˙ K(t),o r( p o t e n t i a l l y )s t o r e d :
C(t)+ ˙ K(t)+δK(t) ≤ Y (t), (5)
where δ denotes the rate of physical depreciation. Although we allow physical capital to be
reversible in principle, in the equilibrium we study negative investment never actually occurs.
Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i, Ai (t), and labor
hours, Li(t), a c c o r d i n gt oas i m p l el i n e a rt e c h n o l o g y :
xi(t)=Ai(t)Li(t) (6)
Intermediates are completely used up in production, but can be produced and stored for later use.
Incumbent intermediate producers must therefore decide whether to sell now, or store and sell
later. We assume that any proﬁts earned from intermediate production are taxed at a constant
rate, ω. Revenue from this tax is redistributed back to households in a lump—sum fashion, so
that the government’s budget is balanced at every date t:
ψ(t)=ωπ(t). (7)
Proﬁt taxes are not a necessary part of a cyclical equilibrium. However, including them helps in
terms of generating cycles with realistic features. Moreover, these tax eﬀects can be thought of
as a convenient representation of various other realistic factors, including implementation costs,
imitation and labor market imperfections.8
The innovation process is exactly as in the quality—ladder model of Grossman and Helpman
(1991). Competitive entrepreneurs in each sector allocate labor eﬀort to innovation, and ﬁnance
this by selling equity shares to households. The rate of success in instant t is µhi(t), where µ is
a parameter, and hi represents the labor hours allocated to innovation in sector i. At each date,
entrepreneurs decide whether or not to allocate labor hours to innovation, and if they do so, how





New ideas and innovations dominate old ones by a factor eγ,w h e r eγ > 0. Successful en-
trepreneurs must choose whether or not to implement their innovation immediately or delay
implementation until a later date.9 Once they implement, the associated knowledge becomes
8For example, in Francois and Lloyd—Ellis (2005), the deadweight loss due to a worker—ﬁrm contracting problem
acts very much like a tax on proﬁts.
9We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation. Recently, Comin (2002) has estimated that the contribution of
measured R&D to productivity growth in the US is less that 1/2 of 1%. As he notes, a larger contribution is likely
to come from unpatented managerial and organizational innovations.
5publicly available, and can be built upon by rivals. However, prior to implementation, the knowl-
edge is privately held by the entrepreneur.10 We let the indicator function Zi(t) take on the value
1 if there exists a successful innovation in sector i which has not yet been implemented, and 0
otherwise. The set of instants in which new ideas are implemented in sector i is denoted by Ωi.
We let V I
i (t) denote the expected present value of proﬁts from implementing a success at time t,
and V D
i (t) denote that of delaying implementation from time t until the most proﬁtable future
date.
2.2 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Given initial state variables {Ai(0),Z i(0)}1
i=0,K(0) an equilibrium for this economy consists of:
(1) sequences
n
ˆ pi(t), ˆ xi(t). ˆ Li(t), ˆ Hi(t), ˆ Ai(t), ˆ Zi(t), ˆ V I





ate sector i, and
(2) economy wide sequences
n
ˆ Y (t), ˆ K(t), ˆ R(t), ˆ w(t), ˆ q(t), ˆ C (t), ˆ S (t)
o
t∈[0,∞)
which satisfy the following conditions:
• Households allocate consumption over time to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint,
(2). The ﬁrst—order conditions of the household’s optimization imply that
ˆ C(t)σ = ˆ C(τ)σe
b R(t)−b R(τ)−ρ(t−τ) ∀ t,τ, (9)
and that the transversality condition holds
lim
τ→∞e− ˆ R(τ) ˆ S(τ)=0 (10)
• Final goods producers choose capital and intermediates, xi, to minimize costs given prices pi,











• The unit elasticity of demand for intermediates implies that limit pricing at the unit cost of the





10Even for the case of intellectual property, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) show that ﬁrms make extensive use
of secrecy in protecting productivity improvements. Secrecy likely plays a more prominent role for entrepreneurial
innovations, which are the key here.
6The resulting instantaneous proﬁt (before any taxes) earned in each sector is given by
π(t)=( 1− e−γ)(1 − α)Y (t). (14)
• Labor markets clear: Z 1
0
ˆ Li(t)di + ˆ H(t)=1 (15)
• Arbitrage trading in ﬁnancial markets implies that, for all assets that are held in strictly positive
amounts by households, the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
ˆ R(s)− ˆ R(t)
s−t .
• Free entry into innovation – entrepreneurs select the sector in which they innovate so as to
maximize the expected present value of the innovation, and
µmax[ˆ V D
i (t), ˆ V I
i (t)] ≤ ˆ w(t), ˆ Hi(t) ≥ 0 with at least one equality. (16)
• At instants where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to im-
plement rather than delay until a later date
ˆ V I
i (t) ≥ ˆ V D
i (t) ∀ t ∈ ˆ Ωi. (17)
• At instants where there is no implementation, either there must be no innovations available to
implement, or entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to delay rather than implement:
Either ˆ Zi(t)=0 , (18)
or if ˆ Zi(t)=1 , ˆ V I
i (t) ≤ ˆ V D
i (t) ∀ t/ ∈ ˆ Ωi.
• Free entry of replacement capital.
3 The Cyclical Equilibrium Growth Path
Although there exists an acyclical equilibrium growth path that satisﬁes the conditions stated
above, our focus here is on a cyclical equilibrium growth path. In this section, we posit a temporal
pattern of innovation and implementation behavior by entrepreneurs. Section 4 then derives the
implications of this for the evolution of aggregate variables, and a set of suﬃcient conditions
under which the implied evolution of aggregate variables, and market clearing, yield optimal
entrepreneurial behavior corresponding with the originally posited behavior.
Suppose then that implementation occurs at discrete dates denoted by Tν where v ∈ {1,2,...,∞}.
We adopt the convention that the vth cycle starts at time Tv−1 and ends at time Tν.T h ep o s i t e d
behavior of innovators and investors over this cycle is illustrated in Figure 3. After implemen-
tation at date Tv−1 an expansion is triggered by a productivity boom and continues through
7subsequent ﬁxed capital formation. During this phase there is no innovation and consequently
all workers are used in production. At some time T∗
v, innovation commences and labor starts to
be withdrawn from production. Innovative successes are not implemented immediately but are
withheld until time Tv.D u r i n gt h i ss e c o n dcontraction phase, ﬁxed capital formation continues,
but the rate of investment declines rapidly. As aggregate demand falls, labor continues to be re-
leased from production, so that innovation grows in anticipation of the subsequent implementation
boom.
Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv−1, no entrepreneurial success has been
made in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no entrepreneurial success
by time Tv conditional on there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv)/Pi(t). Hence, the
value of an incumbent ﬁrm in a sector where no entrepreneurial success has occurred by time t











β(t)=R0(Tv) − R(t) (20)
denotes the discount factor used to discount from time t during the cycle to the beginning of
the next cycle.11 The ﬁrst term in (19) represents the discounted proﬁt stream that accrues to
the entrepreneur with certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected
discounted value of being an incumbent at the beginning of the next cycle.
Lemma 1 : In a cyclical equilibrium, successful entrepreneurs can credibly signal a success
immediately and all innovation in their sector stops until the next round of implementation.
Unsuccessful entrepreneurs have no incentive to falsely announce success. As a result, an entre-
preneur’s signal is credible, and other entrepreneurs will exert their eﬀorts in sectors where they
have a better chance of becoming the dominant entrepreneur.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs’ conjectures ensure no more entrepreneurship in
a sector once a signal of success has been received, until after the next implementation. The
expected value of an entrepreneurial success occurring at some time t ∈ (T∗
v,T v) but whose




11Throughout, we use the subscript 0 to denote the value of a variable immediately after the boom. Formally,
for any variable X(·),w ed e ﬁne X(t)=l i m τ→t− X(τ) and X0(t)=l i m τ→t+ X(τ).
8In the cyclical equilibrium, such delay is optimal; i.e. V D
i (t) >VI
i (t) throughout the contraction.
Successful entrepreneurs are happier to forego immediate proﬁts and delay implementation until
the boom in order to ensure a longer reign of incumbency. Since no implementation occurs during
the cycle, by delaying, the entrepreneur is assured of incumbency until at least Tv+1. Incumbency
beyond that time depends on the probability of another entrepreneurial success.12
The symmetry of sectors implies that entrepreneurial eﬀort is allocated evenly over all sectors
that have not yet experienced a success within the cycle. In the posited cyclical equilibrium, the











In equilibrium, factor prices are proportional to their marginal products. Consequently, standard
aggregation results hold and aggregate output can be expressed as
Y (t)=e(1−α)φt ¯ A1−α
v−1K(t)αL(t)1−α, (23)
where






Note that this endogenous component of TFP is ﬁxed through the cycle. In order to aﬀord a
stationary representation of the economy it is convenient to normalize aggregates by dividing by








Consequently, the intensive form production function is given by
y(t)=k(t)αL(t)1−α. (26)







where r(t)= ˙ R(t). The economy’s aggregate resource constraint is
˙ k(t)=y(t) − c(t) − (φ + δ)k(t) (28)
12A signal of further entrepreneurial success submitted by an incumbent is not credible in equilibrium because
incumbents have incentive to lie to protect their proﬁt stream. No such incentive exists for entrants since, without
a success, proﬁts are zero. Note also that the reason for delay here diﬀers from Shleifer (1986) where the length of
incumbency is exogenously given.
9Finally, factor prices can be expressed as
q(t)=αk(t)α−1L(t)1−α (29)
w(t)=e−γ(1 − α)eφt ¯ Av−1k(t)αL(t)−α. (30)
Note that the wage rate is less than its marginal product by a factor e−γ,r e ﬂecting the fact that
af r a c t i o n1 − e−γ goes in the form of proﬁts to intermediate producers. Moreover, free entry of
replacement capital implies that
Lemma 2 :
r(t)=q(t) − δ. (31)
4.1 Phase 1: The Expansion (Tv−1 → T∗
v)
We now trace out the evolution of the economy implied by the behavior posited above. We start
immediately following an implementation boom, when capital, consumption and output take on
the initial values k0(Tv−1),c 0(Tv−1) and y0(Tv−1), respectively. During the expansion all labor is
used in production so that
L(t)=1 . (32)
Combining this condition with (26), (27), (28), (29) and (31) yields transitional dynamics that












− φ − δ. (34)
These dynamics are illustrated using a phase diagram in Figure 4.
During this expansionary phase, both consumption and capital grow, so we restrict attention
to the lower left quadrant of the phase diagram. As capital accumulates, the wage grows and
the interest rate declines. However, for the dynamic path to be consistent with the cyclical
equilibrium more stringent conditions must be met.
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(φ + δ)k(t), (35)
then there exists a T∗




10The left hand inequality in (35) is depicted in Figure 4 by points below the curve OA. This curve
is a concave function passing through the origin and the intersection of the ˙ k =0and ˙ c =0locii.
As long as the path of the economy lies below this curve during this phase, the consumption—
capital ratio declines though time. This is consistent with the fact that the marginal product of
capital is relatively high, inducing rapid investment and a capital stock that is growing relative
to consumption.
The right hand inequality in (35) is depicted in Figure 4 by points above the line OB.T h i s
line is a ray from the origin that intersects the ˙ k =0locus at its peak. During the ﬁrst phase of
the cycle it cannot be optimal to engage in innovation and then delay implementation until the
subsequent boom. That is
µV D(t) <w (t). (37)
As the capital stock accumulates and TFP grows, w(t) rises through time. Moreover, as the
subsequent boom approaches V D(t) grows at the rate of interest. As long as the path of the





Consequently, the ﬁrst phase of the cycle comes to an end in ﬁnite time.
After the date, T∗
v, if all workers were to remain in production, returns to entrepreneurship
would strictly dominate those in production. As a result, labor hours are re—allocated from
production and into innovation and this triggers the next phase of the cycle. The following Lemma
demonstrates that during the transition from one phase to the next, all aggregate variables evolve
smoothly.
Lemma 3 : At time T∗
v, when entrepreneurship ﬁrst commences in a cycle L(T∗
v)=1 ,a n d
output, investment and consumption must evolve continuously.
4.2 Phase 2: The Downturn (T ∗
v → Tv)
During this phase, capital continues to be accumulated so that (31) must still hold. However,
now there is innovation, so that L(t) < 1. Free entry into innovation implies µV D(t)=w(t), so








11Combining these conditions with (26), (27), (28), (29) and (30) implies that during the slowdown,
























(φ + δ) < 0 (42)
The negative value of ˙ L(t)/L(t) at the beginning of this phase is ensured by condition (35).
Initially, the consumption—capital ratio c(t)/k(t) also continues to decline. However, as L(t)
declines, the marginal product of capital falls and investment starts to fall. Eventually, in the
hypothesized cycle, c(t)/k(t) starts to rise again.
Note that the implied path for L(t) during this phase implies a path for the fraction of the
labor force used in innovation, H(t)=1−L(t). This, in turn, determines the measure of sectors
that innovate at each date:
− ˙ P(t)=µ[1 − L(t)], (43)
where P(T∗
v )=1 .13 At the end of the cycle, the fraction of sectors that have experienced an





µ[1 − L(τ)]dτ. (44)
4.3 The Implementation Boom
We denote the improvement in total factor productivity during implementation, e(1−α)Γv, where
Γv =l n
£ ¯ Av/ ¯ Av−1
¤
. Productivity growth at the boom is given by
Γv = γ (1 − P(Tv)). (45)
A key implication of the assumption that investment is (at least partially) reversible is that house-
hold consumption must evolve smoothly over the period Tv – it cannot jump discontinuously.
Intuitively, if households anticipated a sharp rise in consumption in the future they could raise
their utility by converting some of the capital stock into consumption goods immediately. As a
result, the household’s Euler equation implies that the rate of return on any asset held over the
13T h er a t eo fc h a n g ei nP is given by
˙ P
P = −µhi. But since labor is allocated symmetrically to innovation only
in the measure P of sectors where no innovation has occurred, hi =
H
P ,s ot h a t ˙ P = −µH.
12boom must equal zero.14 In particular, the returns to storing intermediate goods until after the
boom must be zero. A positive return would exist if the wage rose discontinuously upon imple-
mentation because it would be cheaper to produce extra intermediates at the low wage just before
the boom and substitute them for production at the high wage afterwards. The fact that, in equi-
librium, the wage must therefore evolve smoothly across the boom pins down a tight relationship
between the growth in productivity and the labor eﬀort allocated back into production:
Proposition 2 Asset market clearing under reversible investment at the boom requires that
(1 − α)Γv = −αlnL(Tv) (46)
During the boom, ﬁrm values and wages grow in proportion to labor productivity. Since, just
before the boom µV I(Tv)=w(Tv), an immediate corollary is that
µV I
0 (Tv)=w0(Tv)=( 1− α)e−γeφt ¯ Avk0(Tv)α. (47)
Output growth through the boom is given by






It follows directly from Proposition 2 that growth in output exceeds the discount factor across
the boom. Since proﬁts are proportional to output, this explains why ﬁrms are willing to delay
implementation during the downturn. Because investment is reversible, consumption cannot
jump at the boom, and so all of the increase in output must be associated with a sharp rise in
investment.
4.4 Optimal Entrepreneurial Behavior During the Cycle
Optimal entrepreneurial behavior imposes the following requirements on our hypothesized equi-
librium cycle:
• Successful entrepreneurs at time t = Tv must prefer to implement immediately, rather than




• Entrepreneurs who successfully innovate during the slowdown and downturn must prefer to wait
until the beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier and sell at the limit price:
V I(t) <VD(t) ∀ t ∈ (T∗
v,T v) (E2)
14This is in stark contrast to Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), where consumption jumps at the boom.
13• No entrepreneur wants to innovate during the expansion of the cycle. Since in this phase of the
cycle µV D(t) <w (t), this condition requires that
µV I(t) <w (t) ∀ t ∈ (Tv−1,T∗
v) (E3)
• Finally, in constructing the equilibrium above, we have implicitly imposed the requirement that
the downturn is not long enough that all sectors innovate:
P(Tv) > 0. (E4)
Taken together conditions (E1) through (E4) are restrictions on entrepreneurial behavior that
must be satisﬁed for the cyclical growth path we have posited to be an equilibrium.
5 The Stationary Cyclical Growth Path
We focus on a stationary cyclical equilibrium growth path in which the boom size is constant at
Γ every cycle and the cycle length is given by
∆ = Tv − Tv−1 ∀ v. (49)
In addition, we denote the length of the stationary expansion phase as
∆∗ = T∗
v − Tv−1 ∀ v. (50)
Along this path, ¯ A rises by eΓ at each implementation boom, but consumption and capital evolve
continuously so that their normalized values at the beginning of each cycle are given by
c0(Tv)=e−Γc(Tv)=ˆ c (51)
k0(Tv)=e−Γk(Tv)=ˆ k. (52)
In Appendix B, we demonstrate that, for a given stationary cycle length and boom size, a
stationary equilibrium is equivalent to that which would be chosen by a social planner who is
constrained to follow the speciﬁc innovation and implementation path associated with (Γ,∆).T h i s
implication holds despite the presence of imperfect competition in the intermediate goods market
for two reasons: (1) all intermediate sectors consist of monopolists who behave symmetrically
and (2) within the cycle, labor and entrepreneurship are supplied inelastically. Consequently,
relative prices are the same as they would be under perfect competition. The only implication of
monopoly within the cycle is for the distribution of household income between proﬁts and wages.
The existence and uniqueness of a stationary solution to the constrained planner’s problem,
14ˆ k(Γ,∆), is demonstrated using a standard contraction mapping theorem, and requires only that
utility is bounded:15







Thus, for each pair (Γ,∆) satisfying (53), there is a unique stationary path for the endogenous
variables {c(t),k(t),L(t)}Tv
Tv−1 which repeats itself every cycle. We can summarize these within—































where L(t)=1 in phase 1 and L(t) is determined by (42) in phase 2. The associated phase
diagram is shown in Figure 5. In a stationary cycle, the consumption—capital ratio must be the
same at the end as at the beginning Also the capital—labor ratio must be higher at the end than
at the beginning which implies the economy must be to the left of the (k˙ /L)=0locus. During
phase 1 (Tv−1 → T∗
v), condition (35) implies that the economy lies below the (c˙ /k)=0locus, so
that c/k falls and (since L(t)=1) k(t) rises. During phase 2 (T∗
v → Tv), c/k initially continues
to fall, but eventually the economy crosses the (c˙ /k)=0locus, so that it starts to rise again.
For any arbitrary pair of values (Γ,∆) such a stationary cyclical path need not, however,
satisfy either the free entry into innovation condition (Proposition 1) or the asset market clearing
condition at the boom (Proposition 2). In Appendix B we show that under fairly weak parametric
restrictions, only one pair of values
³
ˆ Γ, ˆ ∆
´
can satisfy these conditions along a stationary cyclical
path.16
Proposition 3 :T h e r ee x i s t saσ∗ ∈ [0,1), such that if σ > σ∗,a n di f
(ρ +( σ − 1)φ)e−γ <µ (1 − e−γ)(1 − ω) (56)
then a stationary cyclical equilibrium (ˆ Γ, ˆ ∆,ˆ k) satisfying all the conditions above is unique within
this class of cycling equilibria.
15The fact that household utility is bounded in equilibrium is equivalent to (E1). To see this observe that






0 (Tv), which holds only if R0(Tv+1) − R0(Tv)=
σ (Γ + ∆φ)+ρ∆ > Γ + ∆φ. Re-arranging yields (53).
16Obviously this does not imply that the equilibrium is globally unique, only that it is so within the class of
stationary cyclical paths described above. In particular, we know that there exists at least one other equilibrium
growth path – the standard acyclical one.
155.1 Baseline Example
We numerically solve the model for various combinations of parameters that satisfy (56) and
check the existence conditions (E1)—(E4). The parameters for our baseline example are given in
Table 1.17 The parameters α and γ imply a capital share of 0.3, a labor share of about 0.6 and a
proﬁts h a r eo f0.1.T h ev a l u eo fγ corresponds to a markup rate of around 25%. The unit—valued
intertemporal elasticity of substitution implies logarithmic preferences. Given these values, we
chose µ, ρ and ω so as to match a long—run annual growth rate of about 2%, an average risk—
free real interest rate of roughly 4%, and a cycle length of approximately 8 years. These values
roughly correspond to average data for the post—war US. The implied value of ω is admittedly
rather high if we interpret it purely as a tax on proﬁts.18 However, as noted earlier, we view ω
as representing a number factors that may aﬀect the ratio of proﬁts to wages (e.g. labor market
frictions, implementation costs, imitation).
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of key aggregates over the cycle for this baseline case. In this
example, the capital stock grows monotonically through the ﬁrst phase and into the second, before
starting to decline towards the end of the cycle. Note that this decline is purely due to lack of
maintenance, not because of negative investment. As shown in Figure 7, although the investment
rate falls rapidly in phase 2 it never goes below zero. Consumption evolves much more smoothly
than investment, rising through the ﬁrst phase and slowing down somewhat in the second, before
accelerating at the subsequent implementation boom.
After rising gradually during the expansion, output – deﬁned here as the sum of consumption
goods and ﬁxed capital formation – falls dramatically in phase 2. However, correctly measured
GDP should include the payments made to labour used in producing intangibles. As illustrated in
Figure 6, GDP also falls during phase 2, but much less dramatically. The reason GDP falls is that
labor used in production is being paid below its marginal product. As labour eﬀort is transferred
into innovative activities, the marginal cost in terms of lost output exceeds the marginal beneﬁt
of innovation. In eﬀect, the transfer of labour imposes a negative externality on the proﬁts of
incumbent producers. Because it is oﬀset by the fall in intangible investment, the rise in GDP at
t h eb o o mi sa l s ol e s sd r a m a t i c .
Figure 8 depicts the evolution of w(t)/µ, the value of incumbent intermediate producers that
have not been displaced, V I(t), and the value of innovations whose implementation is delayed until
the subsequent boom. As can be seen the value functions conform with conditions (E1)—(E3).
V I(t) falls through the expansion as dividends are paid out. During the contraction the likelihood
17The Gauss program used to generate the numerical simulations and the diagrams contained here is downloadable
from the following URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/lloyd-ellis/research.html
18McGrattan (1994) estimates taxes on capital income in the US to be approximately 50%.
16of being displaced at the boom declines and towards the end of the cycle this factor dominates,
driving V I(t) sharply upward at the end. Interestingly, the wage does not vary much relative to
trend over the cycle. In this baseline example it is mildly countercyclical, but in general it could
rise more or less rapidly in the contraction. The growth of the wage over the cycle depends on
t h er e l a t i v ee ﬀects of falling capital versus falling labour in production on the rate at which the
capital—labour ratio rises. The eﬀe c to ft h eg r o w t hi nT F Pa tt h eb o o mi se x a c t l yo ﬀset by the
reallocation of labor eﬀort back into production.19
5.2 Comparative Stationary Cycles
Table 2 documents several statistics from the model for various deviations in parameter values
from the baseline example. In most cases we raised or lowered the individual parameter by
10% from its baseline value. In all of the cases considered in the table, the investment is positive
throughout the cycle. The implications for the average annualized rates of growth, ¯ g, and interest,
¯ r, are qualitatively similar to what one would expect along an acyclical growth path. Perhaps
more interesting are the model’s implications for capital formation and intangible accumulation
w h i c hw ec o n s i d e ri nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .
6 Implications for Investment and the Stockmarket
6.1 Tobin’s Q and Investment
Tobin’s Q is typically measured as the ratio of the value of ﬁrms to the book value of their capital





where Π(t) denotes the stock market value of the intangible capital tied up in ﬁrms. Figure 9
illustrates the evolution of Tobin’s Q and the aggregate investment rate over the cycle in the
baseline example.
During an expansion the value of intangible capital is equal to the value of incumbent ﬁrms:
Π(t)=V I(t).S i n c e K(t) rises and V I(t) declines, Tobin’s Q falls monotonically throughout
this phase. During a contraction, some sectors experience innovations, so there exist production
methods that are certain to be made obsolete at the next round of innovation. At time t the
measure of such sectors is 1 − P(t),a n ds o
Π(t)=( 1− P(t))[V T(t)+V D(t)] + P(t)V I(t), (58)
19Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2005) explore in more detail the implications of intrinsic cycles for wages and em-
ployment when labor supply is endogenous.
17where




is the value of these “terminal” production methods. During the contraction Q(t) initially declines
as K(t) continues to grow. However, eventually the growth in the value of intangible capital starts
to dominate as we approach the boom, so that Q(t) rises in anticipation.
The predicted evolution of Q and the investment rate during contractions matches well the
relationship their counterparts in US data. During every post—war U.S. recession (except perhaps
the last one), as depicted by the shaded regions in Figure 1, I/K falls. But more importantly
Tobin’s Q reaches a turning point either at the start, or early in the recession, after which it
heads upwards.20 The model’s dramatic boom makes matching investment behavior in expansions
more diﬃcult, but here there are similarities too. In US expansions, I/K peaks well ahead of the
economy’s peak (though typically not at the boom as our model would have it), and then begins
a gradual decline through the remainder of the expansion before beginning the steeper decline
characteristic of recessions. As in our model, the rate at which I/K tapers oﬀ at the end of
expansions in the data is generally more gradual than its steeper decline through the recessions.
6.2 The Relationship between Tangible and Intangible Capital Formation
A key feature of our results is the asynchronous cyclical movement in the accumulation of tangible
and intangible capital. In our model, the ﬂuctuations in Tobin’s Q reﬂect the changing value of
intangibles relative to the capital stock. However, in the real world the ratio of the market value
of ﬁrm to the replacement cost of their capital stock (i.e. Q in Figure 2) may ﬂuctuate over the
business cycle for reasons other than the value of intangibles. In particular, even in a purely
competitive economy with no proﬁts from innovation, this ratio might ﬂuctuate purely because
of changes in adjustment costs or changes in the stock of inventories held by ﬁrms. Indeed there
are good reasons to believe that these factors may induce counter—cyclical variation in the value
of ﬁrms. In order to obtain a true measure of the value of intangibles, we should net out the
eﬀects of these factors on the ratio.
It turns out that exactly this calculation has recently been undertaken by Hall (2001) for the
US over the period 1952—1999. Using an estimated quadratic adjustment cost model of investment
and data on inventories, Hall backs out a series for the component of aggregate ﬁrm values that is
not associated with these other factors.21 He argues that this series can be viewed as a measure
of the value of the stock of intangibles in the US economy. Although his focus is on the run—up
20The long 1974 recession is somewhat diﬀerent from the others because since Q rises much later, but it is still
qualitatively consistent with the model’s predictions.
21Downloadable from Hall’s web-site http://www.stanford.edu/~rehall/index_ﬁles/Page1379.htm
18in the stock of intangibles during the 1990s, the data is quarterly and is arguably well—suited
to an analysis of the cyclical properties of the value of intangible capital. Figure 10 plots the
cyclical components of the investment rate (I/K) and the ratio of Hall’s intangibles to the capital
stock, computed using a Hodrick—Prescott ﬁlter. As may be seen, intangible capital generally
rises relative to trend when I/K is low and falls in expansions when I/K is high, thus exhibiting
a strikingly counter—cyclical pattern, as predicted by our model.
The asynchronous movements in I and Q in our model are the result of the endogenous
delay at the centre of our cyclical equilibrium. In contractions, though potential productivity is
higher (i.e. knowledge capital is being built) and, hence, equities are rising, the anticipated boom
induces innovators to hold—oﬀ on implementation. Since investment will not pick up again until
after the innovations are implemented, investment lags the movement of equity values (or Tobin’s
Q). In contrast, in the models of Bental and Peled (1996), Freeman et al. (1999), Matsuyama
(1999, 2001) and Walde (2002) the market value of intangible capital is perfectly correlated
with productivity, suggesting that its value should rise contemporaneously with the increase in
incentives for physical capital accumulation.
6.3 Tobin’s Q and Investment at the Sectoral Level
To understand the distinction between the mechanical lead—lag view of the relationship between
the stockmarket and investment, and the mechanism emphasized here, it is useful to think about
the implications at the sectoral level. There is no unique way to disaggregate the model in order
to consider its cross—sectoral implications. Most sectors produce ﬁnal goods and intermediate
goods which are then used by other sectors. Here we consider the implications of one method of
disaggregation which seems reasonable. Speciﬁcally, we think of each sector as producing ﬁnal
goods using capital and intermediates, just as in the aggregate economy, and also producing an
intermediate good, some of which it uses itself and the rest it sells to other sectors. We then ask
w h a tt h eo b s e r v e dr e l a t i o n s h i pw i l lb eb e t w e e nt h eo b s e r v e dr e l a t i v ev a l u e so fQa c r o s ss e c t o r s
and their investment levels.
At some date t during the contraction, a measure 1 − P(t) of sectors will have seen the
arrival of innovations which render the current methods soon to be obsolete. As noted above,
the value of each of these sectors is V T(t)+V D(t). The value of sectors where no innovation
has occurred is V I(t) <VT(t)+V D(t). Since during the boom all sectors in our model increase
investment symmetrically, the predictive content of the relative stock market values of each sector
at any date t<Tis therefore zero. In other words, in our framework, the stockmarket is not
an aggregate index of “news” about sectoral investment opportunities. Rather it is forecasting
19the boom in aggregate demand that will aﬀect all sectors symmetrically, even though only some
experience productivity increments. Although news about future investment opportunities in
diﬀerent sectors is also undoubtedly important, this is not the mechanism at work here.
Interestingly, most studies of the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q at the sectoral
level have generally found at best weak evidence of a relationship (contemporaneous or lagged),
and certainly much weaker than suggested by the correlation between de—trended investment and
lagged Q at the aggregate level.22 Our model oﬀers one interpretation of this diﬀerence – part
of the aggregate relationship may be driven by general equilibrium eﬀects reﬂecting endogenous
delay.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Firms are repositories of both tangible and intangible capital. This paper develops a general
equilibrium theory of investment in both types of capital at business cycle frequencies. Because
of the dynamic externalities inherent in the process of innovation, indepedently acting ﬁrms have
incentives to undertake both types of investment in a clustered and seemingly coordinated fashion.
Consequently, the aggregate economy oscillates between periods of intensive physical capital
accumulation, rapid productivity growth and expanding output, and periods of slowing ﬁxed
capital formation and declining output, but intangible capital accumulation. The behaviour of
aggregates, investment, prices, consumption, interest rates, and the relationship between Tobin’s
Q and tangible investment conform reasonably well with key features of the patterns observed
at business cycle frequencies in US data. Moreover, the evidence regarding intangible capital
accumulation presented by Hall (2001) and others is also consistent with the asynchronous I — Q
cycles generated here.
T h e r ea r et w om a i nd i r e c t i o n st h a tw ep l a nt op u r s u ei nf u t u r er e s e a r c h . F i r s t l y ,t h ec y c l e
that we study here is deterministic and stationary. Variations in the aggregate growth rate and
the length and amplitude of the cycle could be introduced into the present framework by adding
a noise component to the exogenous component of productivity growth. A more ambitious and
interesting extension would be to model the interaction between elements of exogenous aggregate
variation and the model’s cyclical components. We have in mind a framework in which shocks
trigger phases that exhibit recurring and stable patterns of aggregate behavior similar to that
22There is a large literature here, most of which has found these eﬀects to be weak — Blundell, Bond, Devereux,
Schiantarelli (1992), Abel and Blanchard (1986), Hayashi and Innoue (1991) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)
are a few. However recent research constructing an alternative measure of Q based on securities analysts’ earnings
forecasts: Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (1999) and Bond and Cummins (2001), do much better suggesting that
perhaps basic Q theory, with the correct measure of ﬁrm value, can provide guidance to investment behavior at
the micro level.
20modelled here. While we are some way from producing this more ambitious extension, we believe
that such a framework would generate non—linear output dynamics akin to a duration-dependent,
Markov switching process.
A second direction is to study the welfare implications of the endogenous two—way interaction
between growth and cycles present in our framework. Lucas (1987) argued that consumption
volatility is small and likely to be of second order importance to welfare in comparison with factors
aﬀecting secular growth rates. In contrast Barlevy (2004) argues that the volatility of investment
induced by the business cycle contributes adversely to long run growth and hence welfare. In our
model growth rates are eﬀected by changes in factors that smooth cycles, but changes in factors
eﬀecting growth rates also eﬀect the volatility of aggregates at cyclical frequencies. In contrast to
our earlier work (Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003)) consumption here evolves smoothly, providing
a more realistic environment in which to consider the welfare implications of counter-cyclical and
secular policy initiatives.
21Appendix A — Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is
credible, other entrepreneurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1), entrepreneurs have no
incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that i
has a productivity advantage which is eγ times better than the existing incumbent. If continuing
to innovate in that sector, another entrepreneur will, with positive probability, also develop a
productive advantage of eγ. Such an innovation yields expected proﬁt of 0, since, in developing
their improvement, they do not observe the non-implemented improvements of others, so that
both ﬁrms Bertrand compete with the same technology. Returns to attempting innovation in
another sector where there has been no signal of success, or from simply working in production,
w(t) > 0, are thus strictly higher.
Part (2): If success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further innovation
in their sector will cease, from Part (1), by their sending of a costless signal. They are thus
indiﬀerent between falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal.
Thus, there exists a signalling equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of
success.¥






q(τ)K(τ) − ˙ K(τ) − δK(τ)
i
dτ. (60)
Diﬀerentiating (60) with respect to time yields
˙ V K (t)=r(t)V K (t) − q(t)K (t)+ ˙ K (t)+δK(t). (61)
Free entry implies that if ˙ K (t) > 0,t h e nV K (t)=K (t) and ˙ V K (t)= ˙ K (t). The result follows
immediately.¥
















ρ +( 1− σ)δ
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(62)










ρ +( 1− σ)δ
σ
. (63)
which is the left hand inequality in (35).
22For r> ˙ w/w,w er e q u i r et h a t




Substitution using (34 )yields





− φ − δ
¶
, (65)
which rearranges to the right hand inequality in (35).¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : Since capital depreciation rates are independent of utilization, and its
marginal product is always positive, installed capital is always fully utilized. At T∗
v,s i n c et h e
discount factor does not jump, neither does V D. With non—variable capital utilization, the wage
must jump up if L(t) jumps down. Since just before T∗
v, µV D(t) <w (t),t h i si sn o tp o s s i b l e .I t
follows that L(T∗
v)=1and falls smoothly from that point on.
Since L adjusts smoothly, and capital utilization is non—variable, output cannot jump down
at T∗
v. Since the discount factor does not jump, consumption cannot jump at T∗
v either. Conse-
quently, investment, ˙ K, cannot jump at T∗
v.N o t ef u r t h e rt h a tr(t)=q(t)−δ cannot jump down




v a n de m p l o y m e n tg r o w t hi np r o d u c t i o n
˙ L(t)
L(t) must jump to a negative level.¥
Proof of Proposition 2: During the boom, for entrepreneurs to prefer to implement immedi-
a t e l y ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tV I
0 (Tv) >VD
0 (Tv). Just prior to the boom, when the probability
of displacement is negligible, the value of implementing immediately must equal that of delaying
until the boom: δV I(Tv)=δV D(Tv)=w(Tv). Free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom
requires that δV I
0 (Tv) ≤ w0 (Tv). The opportunity cost of ﬁnancing entrepreneurship is the rate
of return on shares in incumbent ﬁrms in sectors where no innovation has occurred. Since this
return across the boom must equal zero, it must be the case that V I
0 (Tv)=V I(Tv). It follows






=( 1− α)Γv − lnL(Tv) ≥ 0. (66)
In sectors with no entrepreneurial success, incumbent ﬁrms could sell claims to stored output,
use them to ﬁnance greater current production and then store the good to sell at the beginning of
the next boom. Free entry into storage implies that the rate of return (the growth in the wage)






=( 1− α)Γv − lnL(Tv) ≤ 0. (67)
Combining (66) and (67) yields (46).¥
23Appendix B — Uniqueness of the Stationary Equilibrium Cycle
We ﬁrst show that the within—cycle decentralized equilibrium is equivalent in its aggregate im-
plications to that which would be chosen by a social planner who is constrained to follow the
innovation and implementation cycle assumed above.
Lemma B1: For a given cycle length, target value of P(Tv), and boundary values for the capital
stock, k0 and kT, the within—cycle dynamics are equivalent to that which would be chosen by a
social planner that is constrained to attain P(Tv) and kT.
Proof: Fix the value of Γ and let P∗ =1−Γ/γ.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the within—cycle problem, taking
the cycle length ∆, and the boundary values k0 and kT as given













˙ k(t)=k(t)αL(t)1−α − (φ + δ)k(t) − c(t) (69)
− ˙ P(t)=µ[1 − L(t)] (70)
k(0) = k0,k (∆)=kT,P (0) = 1,P (∆)=P∗ =1− Γ/γ (71)
L(t) ≤ 1 (72)
where Tv−1 and Tv are normalized to 0 and ∆ respectively.









k(t)αL(t)1−α − (φ + δ)k(t) − c(t)
¤
+λ2(t)µ[1 − L(t)] + ψ(t)[1− L(t)]
where λ1(t) and λ2(t) are the costate variables and ψ(t) is the Lagrange multiplier on the labor
constraint such that ψ(t)[1− L(t)] = 0. The Hamiltonian conditions are (69), (70) and
∂H
∂c
= e−[ρ−(1−σ)φ]tc(t)−σ − λ1 =0 (73)
∂H
∂L
= λ1(t)(1 − α)k(t)αL(t)−α − λ2(t)µ − ψ(t)=0 (74)





αk(t)α−1L(t)1−α − (φ + δ)
¤
(75)




24Case 1: If L(t)=1then ψ(t) > 0.T h e n d i ﬀerentiating (73) w.r.t. time and using (75) to
substitute out ˙ λ1/λ1 we get
ρ +( σ − 1)φ + σ
˙ c
c
= αk(t)α−1 − (φ + δ) (77)
This condition combined with (69) (with L(t)=1 ) are, of course, the Ramsey conditions and are
the same as those from the ﬁrst phase of the cycle. Diﬀerentiating (74) w.r.t. time and using









= −αk(t)α−1 +( φ + δ)+α
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+( 1− α)(φ + δ) (79)
This condition implies that in order for the constraint on labour used in production to eventually
become non—binding, the initial consumption level for a given k0 must be in a range so that








(φ + δ) (80)
If this is the case, then along the optimal path, if ψ > 0 then ˙ ψ < 0 and eventually hits zero. In
this case there exists a T∗ such that L(t)=1if t<T∗ and L(t) < 1 if t>T∗.
Case 2: If L(t) < 1 then ψ(t)=0 . In this case totally diﬀerentiating (73) and (74) w.r.t. time




















Substituting out ˙ λ1/λ1 using (75) and ˙ k/k using (69) we get
ρ +( σ − 1)φ + σ
˙ c(t)
c(t)











(φ + δ) (84)
But these two conditions combined with (69) are identical to those from the decentralized equi-
librium in phase 2 of the cycle.¥
Lemma B2: Given (Γ,∆) satisfying







25the stationary cyclical path implies that the normalized capital stock at the start of each cycle
takes on a unique stationary value, k0(Tv)=ˆ k ∀ v.




V P(k,eΓk0;(Γ,∆)) + e−(ρ+(σ−1)φ)∆e−(σ−1)ΓW(k0;(Γ,∆))
o
(85)








Note that this implies C(T)=C0 (T), (i.e. consumption cannot jump).
We show that the right—hand side of (85) is a contraction mapping in the space of relevant
bounded functions so that it has a ﬁxed point. Let Ξ =[ kmin,k max].a n d l e t f(·) and g(·) be
any two continuous functions from Ξ to Ξ. The maximized within cycle utility function can be
expressed as




H(ˆ c(t),ˆ k(t), ˆ L(t), ˆ λ1(t), ˆ λ2(t),ψ(t),t)+˙ λ1(t)ˆ k(t)
i
dt (86)
+ˆ λ1(0)k0 − ˆ λ1(T)kT − ˆ λ2(T)(1 − P(Γ))


















= −ˆ λ1(T)=−e−(ρ+(σ−1)φ)∆c(T)−σ < 0
Deﬁne the operator Ψ by





subject to k0 ∈ Ξ.T os h o wt h a tΨ is a contraction mapping we must show that it satisﬁes two
suﬃcient conditions (Blackwell’s conditions):
26(a) Monotonicity: Suppose f(k) ≥ g(k) ∀k ∈ Ξ.L e tkf and kg attain Ψ◦f and Ψ◦g, respectively
for some arbitrary given k ∈ Ξ.T h e n
Ψ ◦ g(k)=V P(k,eΓkg)+e−(ρ+(σ−1)φ)∆e−(σ−1)Γg(kg)
≤ V P(k,eΓkg)+e−(ρ+(σ−1)φ)∆e−(σ−1)Γf(kg) (since f(kg) ≥ g(kg))
≤ V P(k,eΓkf)+e−(ρ+(σ−1)φ)∆e−(σ−1)Γf(kf) (by deﬁnition)
= Ψ ◦ f(k)













Clearly, setting β = e−(ρ−(1−σ)φ)∆e(1−σ)Γ will satisfy this condition as long as







which must be true in the cyclical equilibrium.
Let k0 = F(k) be the optimal policy attaining W(k).S i n c eF(k):Ξ → Ξ, and is continuous,
it has a ﬁxed point k∗ in Ξ,s ot h a tk∗ = F(k∗) and
W(k∗,Γ,∆)=V P(k∗,e Γk∗,Γ,∆)+e−(ρ−(1−σ)φ)∆e−(σ−1)ΓW(k∗,Γ,∆).¥
Lemma B3: There exists a σ0 ∈ [0,1) such that if σ > σ0 then
(a) an increase in Γ decreases the steady state capital stock, ˆ k.
(b) an increase in ∆ increases the steady state capital stock, ˆ k.
Proof: T h ep r o o fu s e st h ef o l l o w i n gﬁrst and second derivatives of the maximized within-cycle
value function, V P(ˆ k,eΓˆ k,Γ,∆):
V P
1 = c−σ
0 > 0,V P































































27Along an optimal stationary cyclical path for a given Γ and ∆, the planner’s problem implies the
Euler condition that
Z(ˆ k,eΓˆ k,Γ,∆)=V P
2 (ˆ k,eΓˆ k,Γ,∆)+e−ˆ ρ∆−(σ−1)ΓV P
1 (ˆ k,eΓˆ k,Γ,∆)=0 .




21 + eΓV P
22 + e−ˆ ρ∆−(σ−1)Γ ¡
V P






























Using the Euler condition, we can write this as
∂Z
∂ˆ k


































The negative sign follows from the fact that both derivatives in brackets must be negative within
ac y c l e . T h eﬁrst because,
∂r(t)
∂k0 < 0 for all t in the cycle, and
∂ ln(cT/c0)
∂R > 0, where R is the
interest rate discounting from 0 to T. The second holds similarly because
∂r(t)
∂kT < 0 for all t in
the cycle up to T, and again
∂ ln(cT/c0)
∂R > 0, where R is the interest rate discounting from 0 to T.
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− (σ − 1)e−ˆ ρ∆−(σ−1)ΓV P
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− (σ − 1)e−ˆ ρ∆−(σ−1)ΓV P
1
When Γ increases more labor must be allocated towards innovation in the second phase. Con-
sequently, consumption must grow less during the cycle so that the ﬁrst term above is negative.
Clearly if σ ≥ 1 the second term is negative. Deﬁne σ0 < 1:the two terms are equal. For σ > σ0
the ﬁrst term dominates and ∂Z
∂Γ < 0. It follows that at the stationary optimum:
dˆ k
dΓ









´ < 0. (87)




2∆ + e−ˆ ρ∆−(σ−1)ΓV P
1∆ − ˆ ρe−ˆ ρ∆−(σ−1)ΓV P
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28When ∆ increases, relatively more output can be allocated towards consumption in the second
phase so that the derivative in brackets must be positive. It follows that
dˆ k
d∆









´ > 0. (88)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :The proof shows that given the social planning solution for each pair
(Γ,T) only one of these pairs (ˆ Γ, ˆ T) is consistent with both




(2) free entry into innovation
£
µV D(t) − w(t)
¤
L(t)=0∀t.
Essentially, we show that (1) can be represented by a negative relationship between Γ and ∆ like
that labelled AMC in Figure 11 and (2) can be represented by a positive relationship like that
labelled FEI.





at all points within the cycle, condition (1) boils down to the equilibrium requirement that the
(Γ,∆) must satisfy
w(T)=w0(T)
which implies that the expected return from storage across the boom must be zero:





lnLT(Γ,∆,ˆ k(Γ,∆)) = 0


































It follows that along the AMC curve where Z =0 :
dΓ
d∆









∂∆ + ∂ lnLT









∂Γ + ∂ lnLT
∂ˆ k .∂ˆ k
∂Γ
i < 0
29To see that this slope is indeed negative, note that from Lemma B3 we have that ∂ˆ k
∂Γ < 0 and
∂ˆ k
∂∆ > 0. Also note that ∂ lnLT
∂ˆ k > 0 since the higher is the capital stock the more costly it is to divert
a marginal unit of labour from production at any date (since its marginal product is higher). Since
innovative eﬀorts are cumulative, increasing ∆ makes it optimal to reduce innovation (1 − L(t))
for all t, ceteris parabus, consequently ∂ lnLT
∂∆ > 0. It follows that the numerator is positive.
Similarly increasing Γ, holding ∆ ﬁxed, requires more labour diverted from production at any
t,s ot h a t∂ lnLT
∂Γ < 0. Although the term in square brackets in the denominator is therefore
negative, it must be less than −1.S i n c eα < 1/2, the negative slope of AMC follows.¥





condition (2) reduces to the equilibrium requirement that
µV D(∆∗;Γ,∆)=w(∆∗;Γ,∆)
µe−[R(T)−R(T∗)]eΓV I
























































µ(1 − e−γ)(1 − ω)
= X
























For all τ < ∆∗,
c(τ)
k(τ) must be increasing in the steady—state capital stock at the start of each cycle
– an increase in k∗ reduces the marginal product of capital, so that the social planner allocates
30marginally less income to investment and more to consumption. It follows from Lemma B3 that

















































dτ ≤ 0,as u ﬃcient condition for ∂X





0. Clearly this must hold for σ ≥ 1, and will hold for σ < 1 if suﬃciently large.



























dτ ≥ 0,as u ﬃcient condition for ∂X
∂∆ > 0 is
(ρ +( σ − 1)φ)e−γ
µ(1 − e−γ)(1 − ω)
< 1
Thus, the slope of the FEI curve is given by
dΓ
d∆


































If σ ≥ 1 and (ρ+(σ −1)φ)e−γ <µ (1−e−γ)(1−ω) (so that (ρ+(σ −1)φ)X<1), this is clearly
positive. For lower values of σ it may still be positive.¥
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Table 2: Comparative Stationary Cycles
Parameters Γ ∆ ∆∗ k∗ ¯ g (%) ¯ r (%) P(T)
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Figure 9: Tobin’s Q and the Rate of Investment
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Figure 11: Uniqueness of the Stationary Equilibrium Cycle
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